Forward induction in coordination games

Russell Cooper; Douglas V. De Jong; Robert Forsythe; Thomas W. Ross

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-M

Forward induction in coordination games

Russell Cooper, Douglas V. De Jong, Robert Forsythe, Thomas W. Ross

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on the power of forward induction arguments in a 2×2 coordination game. Allowing one player the option of obtaining a certain payoff instead of playing the game coordinates play in the direction predicted by the forward induction argument. However, two-way pre-play communication is a more effective coordination device.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	167-172
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	40
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-M
State	Published - Oct 1992

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-M

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title = "Forward induction in coordination games",

abstract = "This paper provides experimental evidence on the power of forward induction arguments in a 2×2 coordination game. Allowing one player the option of obtaining a certain payoff instead of playing the game coordinates play in the direction predicted by the forward induction argument. However, two-way pre-play communication is a more effective coordination device.",

author = "Russell Cooper and {De Jong}, {Douglas V.} and Robert Forsythe and Ross, {Thomas W.}",

note = "Funding Information: Correspondence to: Russell Cooper, Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA. * Financial support has been provided by the National Science Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. DeJong acknowledges the support of the McGladrey Institute of Accounting Research.",

year = "1992",

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language = "English (US)",

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T1 - Forward induction in coordination games

AU - Cooper, Russell

AU - De Jong, Douglas V.

AU - Forsythe, Robert

AU - Ross, Thomas W.

N1 - Funding Information: Correspondence to: Russell Cooper, Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA. * Financial support has been provided by the National Science Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. DeJong acknowledges the support of the McGladrey Institute of Accounting Research.

PY - 1992/10

Y1 - 1992/10

N2 - This paper provides experimental evidence on the power of forward induction arguments in a 2×2 coordination game. Allowing one player the option of obtaining a certain payoff instead of playing the game coordinates play in the direction predicted by the forward induction argument. However, two-way pre-play communication is a more effective coordination device.

AB - This paper provides experimental evidence on the power of forward induction arguments in a 2×2 coordination game. Allowing one player the option of obtaining a certain payoff instead of playing the game coordinates play in the direction predicted by the forward induction argument. However, two-way pre-play communication is a more effective coordination device.

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U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-M

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90217-M

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VL - 40

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EP - 172

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Forward induction in coordination games

Abstract

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