Abstract
An earlier analysis of Cavalcanti and Wallace showing that the set of allocations achievable using outside (government) money is a subset of those achievable using inside (private) money is extended. Here, the class of outside-money allocations is enriched by allowing the planner to make transfers in the form of outside money. At the same time, punishments for defection are weakened. It is shown that the subset result continues to hold, although for a different reason than in the Cavalcanti and Wallace analysis.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 619-631 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | International Economic Review |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2005 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics