Game theoretic formation of a centrality based network

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added adjacent edge. We simulate the interactions between players using an algorithm that factors in rational strategic behavior based on a common objective function. The resulting networks exhibit pair wise stability, from which we derive necessary stable conditions for specific graph topologies. We then expand the model to simulate non-trivial games with large numbers of players. We show that using conditions necessary for the stability of star topologies we can induce the formation of hub players that positively impact the total welfare of the network.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Social Informatics, SocialInformatics 2012
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages56-61
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9780769550152
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012
Event2012 ASE International Conference on Social Informatics, SocialInformatics 2012 - Washington, D.C., United States
Duration: Dec 14 2012Dec 16 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Social Informatics, SocialInformatics 2012

Other

Other2012 ASE International Conference on Social Informatics, SocialInformatics 2012
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWashington, D.C.
Period12/14/1212/16/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Information Systems and Management

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