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Game-theoretic learning in a distributed-information setting: Distributed convergence to mean-centric equilibria

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

    Abstract

    The paper considers distributed learning in large-scale games via fictitious-play type algorithms. Given a preassigned communication graph structure for information exchange among the players, this paper studies a distributed implementation of the Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play (ECFP) algorithm that is well-suited to large-scale games in terms of complexity and memory requirements. It is shown that the distributed algorithm converges to an equilibrium set denoted as the mean-centric equilibria (MCE) for a reasonably large class of games.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationConference Record of the 48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2014
    EditorsMichael B. Matthews
    PublisherIEEE Computer Society
    Pages1616-1620
    Number of pages5
    ISBN (Electronic)9781479982974
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 24 2015
    Event48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2014 - Pacific Grove, United States
    Duration: Nov 2 2014 → Nov 5 2014

    Publication series

    NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
    Volume2015-April
    ISSN (Print)1058-6393
    ISSN (Electronic)2576-2303

    Conference

    Conference48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2014
    Country/TerritoryUnited States
    CityPacific Grove
    Period11/2/14 → 11/5/14

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Signal Processing
    • Computer Networks and Communications

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