Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Game-theoretic learning in a distributed-information setting: Distributed convergence to mean-centric equilibria

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    The paper considers distributed learning in large-scale games via fictitious-play type algorithms. Given a preassigned communication graph structure for information exchange among the players, this paper studies a distributed implementation of the Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play (ECFP) algorithm that is well-suited to large-scale games in terms of complexity and memory requirements. It is shown that the distributed algorithm converges to an equilibrium set denoted as the mean-centric equilibria (MCE) for a reasonably large class of games.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationConference Record of the 48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
    EditorsMichael B. Matthews
    PublisherIEEE Computer Society
    Pages1616-1620
    Number of pages5
    ISBN (Electronic)9781479982974
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 24 2015
    Event48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2015 - Pacific Grove, United States
    Duration: Nov 2 2014Nov 5 2014

    Publication series

    NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
    Volume2015-April
    ISSN (Print)1058-6393

    Other

    Other48th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2015
    Country/TerritoryUnited States
    CityPacific Grove
    Period11/2/1411/5/14

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Signal Processing
    • Computer Networks and Communications

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Game-theoretic learning in a distributed-information setting: Distributed convergence to mean-centric equilibria'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this