TY - JOUR
T1 - Governance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives
T2 - The Case of Proxy Access
AU - Bhandari, Tara
AU - Iliev, Peter
AU - Kalodimos, Jonathan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/8
Y1 - 2021/8
N2 - We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.
AB - We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85090128644&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85090128644&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0022109020000484
DO - 10.1017/S0022109020000484
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85090128644
SN - 0022-1090
VL - 56
SP - 1590
EP - 1621
JO - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
JF - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
IS - 5
ER -