TY - JOUR
T1 - Has R&D investment become riskier for CEOs after the Sarbanes Oxley Act?
AU - Lee, Seung Won
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Authors. Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
PY - 2024/7
Y1 - 2024/7
N2 - This study explores the link between R&D investment variability and CEO turnover across the eras surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). It posits that, after SOX, R&D expenditure hikes not matched by sales growth may trigger more frequent CEO turnover, driven by a perceived increase in risk. Data from 1996 to 2010 reveal that, before SOX, R&D increases positively correlate with CEO job stability. In contrast, after SOX, a rise in R&D spending is linked to a higher rate of CEO turnover, particularly involuntary dismissals. The study further identifies that post-SOX, the negative impact of R&D spikes on CEO turnover is significantly mitigated when such investment aligns with sales growth. The findings suggest a significant influence of R&D investments on CEO turnover, underscoring the need for boards to deliberate the consequences of R&D spending and CEO turnover to better align shareholders and CEO interests.
AB - This study explores the link between R&D investment variability and CEO turnover across the eras surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). It posits that, after SOX, R&D expenditure hikes not matched by sales growth may trigger more frequent CEO turnover, driven by a perceived increase in risk. Data from 1996 to 2010 reveal that, before SOX, R&D increases positively correlate with CEO job stability. In contrast, after SOX, a rise in R&D spending is linked to a higher rate of CEO turnover, particularly involuntary dismissals. The study further identifies that post-SOX, the negative impact of R&D spikes on CEO turnover is significantly mitigated when such investment aligns with sales growth. The findings suggest a significant influence of R&D investments on CEO turnover, underscoring the need for boards to deliberate the consequences of R&D spending and CEO turnover to better align shareholders and CEO interests.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85184456161&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85184456161&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/jcaf.22698
DO - 10.1002/jcaf.22698
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85184456161
SN - 1044-8136
VL - 35
SP - 350
EP - 363
JO - Journal of Corporate Accounting and Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Accounting and Finance
IS - 3
ER -