Herding with collective preferences

S. Nageeb Ali; Navin Kartik

doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

Herding with collective preferences

S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

38 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	601-626
Number of pages	26
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	51
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7
State	Published - Nov 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

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Herding with collective preferences

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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