How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks

Benjamin Johnson; Aron Laszka; Jens Grossklags

doi:10.1145/2590296.2590308

How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks

Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

The systematic risk of a networked system depends to a large extent on its topology. In this paper, we explore this dependency using a model of risk propagation from the literature on interdependent security games. Our main area of focus is on the number of nodes that go down after an attack takes place. We develop a simulation algorithm to study the effects of such attacks on arbitrary topologies, and apply this simulation to scale-free networks. We investigate by graphical illustration how the outcome distribution of such networks exhibits correlation effects that increase the likelihood of losing more nodes at once - an effect having direct applications to cyber-insurance.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages	495-500
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450328005
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2590296.2590308
State	Published - Jun 4 2014
Event	9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2014 - Kyoto, Japan Duration: Jun 4 2014 → Jun 6 2014

Publication series

Name	ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security

Other

Other	9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2014
Country/Territory	Japan
City	Kyoto
Period	6/4/14 → 6/6/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Computer Networks and Communications
Computer Science Applications
Information Systems

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10.1145/2590296.2590308

Cite this

Johnson, B., Laszka, A., & Grossklags, J. (2014). How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks. In ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (pp. 495-500). (ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/2590296.2590308

Johnson, Benjamin ; Laszka, Aron ; Grossklags, Jens. / How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks. ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2014. pp. 495-500 (ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security).

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title = "How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks",

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author = "Benjamin Johnson and Aron Laszka and Jens Grossklags",

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Johnson, B, Laszka, A & Grossklags, J 2014, How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks. in ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, pp. 495-500, 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2014, Kyoto, Japan, 6/4/14. https://doi.org/10.1145/2590296.2590308

How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks. / Johnson, Benjamin; Laszka, Aron; Grossklags, Jens.
ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2014. p. 495-500 (ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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Johnson B, Laszka A, Grossklags J. How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks. In ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. 2014. p. 495-500. (ASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security). doi: 10.1145/2590296.2590308

How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks

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