TY - JOUR
T1 - Implementing results-oriented trade policies
T2 - the case of the US-Japanese auto parts dispute
AU - Krishna, Kala
AU - Morgan, John
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank Eric Bond and Elhanan Helpman for their helpful comments, an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper, and Ataman Ozyildirim for his able research assistance. Research support from the National Science Foundation, grant SBR-9320825, is gratefully acknowledged by the first author.
PY - 1998/9/1
Y1 - 1998/9/1
N2 - Why would the US threaten punitive tariffs on luxury autos to implement a market share target in auto parts? We show that by making threats to a linked market, a market share target may be implemented with fairly weak informational and administrative requirements. Moreover, such policies can be both pro-competitive and advantageous to US firms.
AB - Why would the US threaten punitive tariffs on luxury autos to implement a market share target in auto parts? We show that by making threats to a linked market, a market share target may be implemented with fairly weak informational and administrative requirements. Moreover, such policies can be both pro-competitive and advantageous to US firms.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00091-3
DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00091-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031789857
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 42
SP - 1443
EP - 1467
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
IS - 8
ER -