Abstract
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent's set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent's own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 307-324 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 142 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2009 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy