Incorporating trust into combinatorial auctions: What does trust cost?

Guruprasad Airy, Po Chun Chen, Tracy Mullen, John Yen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller s trust or reliability. In this paper, we describe a combinatorial auction mechanism that allows buyers to specify their preferences over both an item and the seller s trustworthiness, and use it to generate a bid for a bundle of items. We consider some implications of generating a combined trust rating for a bundle of resources that are supplied by more than one seller. We show that allowing buyers to specify trust preferences leads to a higher overall utility and task completion rate than when compared with a model that does not consider seller trustworthiness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IAT Workshops 2009
Pages607-613
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IAT Workshops 2009 - Milano, Italy
Duration: Sep 15 2009Sep 18 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IAT Workshops 2009
Volume3

Other

Other2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IAT Workshops 2009
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityMilano
Period9/15/099/18/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

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