Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games

Alberto Bressan; Fabio S. Priuli

doi:10.1016/j.jde.2006.01.005

Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games

Alberto Bressan, Fabio S. Priuli

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

For a noncooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	230-257
Number of pages	28
Journal	Journal of Differential Equations
Volume	227
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jde.2006.01.005
State	Published - Aug 1 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Analysis
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.jde.2006.01.005

Cite this

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abstract = "For a noncooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.",

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AB - For a noncooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.

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Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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