TY - JOUR
T1 - Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
AU - Hu, Tai Wei
AU - Wallace, Neil
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a Shapley-Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for uniqueness are also provided.
AB - A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a Shapley-Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for uniqueness are also provided.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84947919423
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 161
SP - 103
EP - 144
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -