TY - JOUR
T1 - Information and Auction Performance
T2 - A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management
AU - Banerjee, Simanti
AU - Kwasnica, Anthony Mark
AU - Shortle, James Samuel
PY - 2015/7/10
Y1 - 2015/7/10
N2 - Conservation auctions are used by public agencies to procure environmental friendly land uses from private landowners. We present the structure of an iterative conservation auction that ranks bids according to a scoring rule intended to procure spatially adjacent conservation land use projects. Laboratory experiments are conducted to compare the performance of this auction under two information conditions. Under one condition subjects have knowledge about the spatial goal implemented by the scoring rule and in the other case they don’t. The results indicate that rent-seeking is intensified with more information and increased bidder familiarity with the auction. Revealing the spatial information on the other hand has no impact on auction efficiency.
AB - Conservation auctions are used by public agencies to procure environmental friendly land uses from private landowners. We present the structure of an iterative conservation auction that ranks bids according to a scoring rule intended to procure spatially adjacent conservation land use projects. Laboratory experiments are conducted to compare the performance of this auction under two information conditions. Under one condition subjects have knowledge about the spatial goal implemented by the scoring rule and in the other case they don’t. The results indicate that rent-seeking is intensified with more information and increased bidder familiarity with the auction. Revealing the spatial information on the other hand has no impact on auction efficiency.
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U2 - 10.1007/s10640-014-9798-4
DO - 10.1007/s10640-014-9798-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84930573095
SN - 0924-6460
VL - 61
SP - 409
EP - 431
JO - Environmental and Resource Economics
JF - Environmental and Resource Economics
IS - 3
ER -