@article{8ec32b8e755a4e53975176d259c60b9c,
title = "Information Asymmetry, Regulations and Equilibrium Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Housing Rental Market",
abstract = "We explore the role of information asymmetry and regulations on equilibrium outcomes in rental markets to show that while landlords price the cost of regulations into rent, they also invest in tenant screening to alleviate information asymmetry, thus restricting access to rental housing. We are the first to document this additional tenant screening in response to regulations.",
author = "Ambrose, {Brent W.} and Moussa Diop",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Stephen Malpezzi, Joseph Ooi, Stuart Rosenthal and participants at the 2016 Real Estate Finance & Investment Symposium at the University of Cambridge, UK, the May 2016 session of the Weimer School of Advanced Studies in Real Estate and Land Economics of Homer Hoyt Institute, and the 2017 Annual AREUEA Meeting in Chicago. Research assistance provided by Dennis McWeeny. Funding for data was from the Institute for Real Estate Studies at Smeal College of Business of the Pennsylvania State University. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1111/1540-6229.12262",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "49",
pages = "74--110",
journal = "Real Estate Economics",
issn = "1080-8620",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
}