INFORMATION-BASED COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RIVAL OWNERS IN RATING AGENCIES

This study extends competitive dynamics research by theorizing how and when information about a firm may be shaped by competitive forces operating through information intermediaries. Arguing that ownership bestows investors with influence over information intermediaries from which investors can profit, we suggest that firms receive less favorable ratings from rating agencies in which their rivals’ investors have greater ownership. Building on research in this vein, we develop a dynamic theory of information-based competition that suggests the rating discounts a firm receives from rating agencies owned by its rivals’ investors are shaped by the reputational threats and opportunities faced by the firm and its rivals, which motivate and enable investors to use information intermediaries to intervene in competitive dynamics. Analyses of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings of 2,787 firms by a leading ESG rating agency support these ideas. Our study introduces the concept of information-based competition and illuminates the conditions under which investors engage in information-based competitive attacks.