TY - JOUR
T1 - Institution design and public good provision
T2 - an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
AU - Tergiman, Chloe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Economic Science Association.
PY - 2015/12/1
Y1 - 2015/12/1
N2 - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
AB - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84946095897
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84946095897#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y
DO - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84946095897
SN - 1386-4157
VL - 18
SP - 697
EP - 717
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
IS - 4
ER -