Institutions and ambivalence: Party management, adversarialism, and british policy toward Europe

Explanations of British policy toward the European Union typically focus on historical experience or economic circumstance. But these perspectives can not answer a critical question: why does a political system that has accommodated European integration to a significant degree in its administrative structures have such difficulty reaching definitive policy positions on core issues? In this paper we build on the insights of several scholars who approach policy formulation from an institutionalist perspective. We argue that a causally primordial institution, the UK electoral system, has given rise to two particular forms of political behavior -- party management and adversarialism - which may induce an approach of delay and indecision rather than decisive policy choice. Party management and adversarialism vary in salience depending on the size of the governing party's majority, and the level of unity in both the governing party and the main opposition party. The strains of party management and adversarialism force governments to formulate policy in a manner which departs from systems containing parties with narrower ideological ranges that are governed by bargaining and compromise.