Investigating the characteristics of one-sided matching mechanisms

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

For one-sided matching problems, two widely studied mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). The induced outcomes of these two mechanisms are often incomparable and thus there are challenges when it comes to deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. Working in the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS and analyze their economic properties.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1443-1444
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
StatePublished - 2016
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: May 9 2016May 13 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period5/9/165/13/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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