TY - JOUR
T1 - Keeping Appointments
T2 - The Politics of Confirming United States Attorneys
AU - Nelson, Michael J.
AU - Ostrander, Ian
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2016/7/2
Y1 - 2016/7/2
N2 - As the gatekeepers of federal law, U.S. Attorneys have a strong influence on legal policy. While U.S. Attorneys are presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation, the rules governing their appointments differ significantly from those used for executive and judicial nominees. Specifically, U.S. District Courts may name interim appointees if prolonged stalemate occurs. When combined with other recent rules changes favoring presidents, U.S. Attorney nominations provide an opportunity to observe how variations in rules influence the confirmation process. Examining all U.S. Attorney nominations between 1987 and 2010, we find evidence that U.S. Attorneys are generally confirmed faster than other executive or judicial nominations even while familiar predictors of delay remain important. The findings have broad implications for the study of appointments and confirmation politics.
AB - As the gatekeepers of federal law, U.S. Attorneys have a strong influence on legal policy. While U.S. Attorneys are presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation, the rules governing their appointments differ significantly from those used for executive and judicial nominees. Specifically, U.S. District Courts may name interim appointees if prolonged stalemate occurs. When combined with other recent rules changes favoring presidents, U.S. Attorney nominations provide an opportunity to observe how variations in rules influence the confirmation process. Examining all U.S. Attorney nominations between 1987 and 2010, we find evidence that U.S. Attorneys are generally confirmed faster than other executive or judicial nominations even while familiar predictors of delay remain important. The findings have broad implications for the study of appointments and confirmation politics.
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U2 - 10.1080/0098261X.2015.1125820
DO - 10.1080/0098261X.2015.1125820
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84955129425
SN - 0098-261X
VL - 37
SP - 211
EP - 231
JO - Justice System Journal
JF - Justice System Journal
IS - 3
ER -