TY - JOUR
T1 - Latent bombs of disinformation
AU - Santos, Marcelo
AU - Park, Chang Sup
AU - Bastos dos Santos, João Guilherme
AU - Cavalini, Athus
AU - Gil de Zúñiga, Homero
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - This study builds on the literature on disinformation and conspiracy theories to propose the concept of Latent Bombs of Disinformation (LBD). LBD refers to a long-term antidemocratic political strategy involving the persistent dissemination of misleading information, designed to be activated under specific conditions. The framework operationalizes LBD at three levels: macro (e.g., institutional strength), meso (e.g., media catalysts), and micro (e.g., media consumption habits). Using the 2021 presidential election in Chile and the 2022 election in Brazil as case studies, we analyze ‘electoral fraud’ narratives based on data from legacy media publications and fringe, politically aligned Telegram groups supporting losing parties, spanning the period between the first ballot and the run-off. The results highlight key differences: Brazil experienced vandalism, whereas Chile did not. Additionally, we identified evidence of coordinated activity on Telegram in Brazil but not in Chile. We contextualize these findings, discuss their implications, and suggest avenues for future research.
AB - This study builds on the literature on disinformation and conspiracy theories to propose the concept of Latent Bombs of Disinformation (LBD). LBD refers to a long-term antidemocratic political strategy involving the persistent dissemination of misleading information, designed to be activated under specific conditions. The framework operationalizes LBD at three levels: macro (e.g., institutional strength), meso (e.g., media catalysts), and micro (e.g., media consumption habits). Using the 2021 presidential election in Chile and the 2022 election in Brazil as case studies, we analyze ‘electoral fraud’ narratives based on data from legacy media publications and fringe, politically aligned Telegram groups supporting losing parties, spanning the period between the first ballot and the run-off. The results highlight key differences: Brazil experienced vandalism, whereas Chile did not. Additionally, we identified evidence of coordinated activity on Telegram in Brazil but not in Chile. We contextualize these findings, discuss their implications, and suggest avenues for future research.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105003300257
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105003300257#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1080/1369118X.2025.2492575
DO - 10.1080/1369118X.2025.2492575
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105003300257
SN - 1369-118X
JO - Information Communication and Society
JF - Information Communication and Society
ER -