TY - JOUR
T1 - Marketing and production capacity strategy for non-differentiated products
T2 - Winning and losing at the capacity cycle game
AU - Dearden, James A.
AU - Lilien, Gary L.
AU - Yoon, Eunsang
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Kalyan Chatterjee, Josh Eliashberg, John McNamara, and Christophe Van den Bulte. This research was supported by Penn State's Institute for the Study of Business Markets. The authors thank several ISBM members for providing access and insight.
PY - 1999/2
Y1 - 1999/2
N2 - Customer satisfaction and supplier loyalty in markets where products are mainly undifferentiated are heavily affected by assurance of supply. Marketers manage production capacity in such markets to assure supply, but the resulting capacity competition leads to cycles of over-capacity followed by capacity deletions, which lead to under-capacity. We investigate some of the possible causes of this form of industry behavior in two ways. First, we report on an exploratory empirical investigation, motivated by in-depth interviews with industry executives, and develop a set of structural principles. We formalize those principles in a set of statistical models. Next, we review some related theory and identify a number of possible reasons that may combine to cause this phenomenon. We develop some simple, game theoretic models that focus on the issues of strategic interaction with demand uncertainty and different values of capacity change. We use the theory results to illustrate how over- and under-capacity situations arise. We compare our theoretical and empirical results and find an encouraging degree of convergence. We discuss the implications of these findings for individual firm strategies.
AB - Customer satisfaction and supplier loyalty in markets where products are mainly undifferentiated are heavily affected by assurance of supply. Marketers manage production capacity in such markets to assure supply, but the resulting capacity competition leads to cycles of over-capacity followed by capacity deletions, which lead to under-capacity. We investigate some of the possible causes of this form of industry behavior in two ways. First, we report on an exploratory empirical investigation, motivated by in-depth interviews with industry executives, and develop a set of structural principles. We formalize those principles in a set of statistical models. Next, we review some related theory and identify a number of possible reasons that may combine to cause this phenomenon. We develop some simple, game theoretic models that focus on the issues of strategic interaction with demand uncertainty and different values of capacity change. We use the theory results to illustrate how over- and under-capacity situations arise. We compare our theoretical and empirical results and find an encouraging degree of convergence. We discuss the implications of these findings for individual firm strategies.
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U2 - 10.1016/s0167-8116(98)00023-8
DO - 10.1016/s0167-8116(98)00023-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0042302841
SN - 0167-8116
VL - 16
SP - 57
EP - 74
JO - International Journal of Research in Marketing
JF - International Journal of Research in Marketing
IS - 1
ER -