TY - GEN
T1 - Matching games for wireless networks with energy cooperation
AU - Varan, Burak
AU - Yener, Aylin
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation Grants CNS 09-64364 and CCF 14-22347.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2016/6/15
Y1 - 2016/6/15
N2 - We consider a wireless ad hoc network composed of N transmitters and M receivers which are all selfish in the sense that they wish to optimize their individual utilities rather than a network wide utility. Each node can acquire energy from a supplier at a price to power the transmission or reception of data. For such a network, we consider a matching game played between the transmitters and the receivers. The transmitters compute the optimal rate for them and propose this to a receiver. The receivers determine the best proposal they have received to maximize their utilities. We identify the optimal decisions for all nodes and the resulting utilities. We next consider a Vickrey auction between transmitters which have proposed to the same receiver. We show that the transmitters can compete with each other by offering energy transfer to the receiver. The energy transfer reduces the processing costs of the receiver and influences its decision, thereby pointing to the merit of energy cooperation. We observe that populating the network with additional nodes generally results in more options for all nodes to choose from, and larger rates for the entire network, which are improved even further by energy cooperation.
AB - We consider a wireless ad hoc network composed of N transmitters and M receivers which are all selfish in the sense that they wish to optimize their individual utilities rather than a network wide utility. Each node can acquire energy from a supplier at a price to power the transmission or reception of data. For such a network, we consider a matching game played between the transmitters and the receivers. The transmitters compute the optimal rate for them and propose this to a receiver. The receivers determine the best proposal they have received to maximize their utilities. We identify the optimal decisions for all nodes and the resulting utilities. We next consider a Vickrey auction between transmitters which have proposed to the same receiver. We show that the transmitters can compete with each other by offering energy transfer to the receiver. The energy transfer reduces the processing costs of the receiver and influences its decision, thereby pointing to the merit of energy cooperation. We observe that populating the network with additional nodes generally results in more options for all nodes to choose from, and larger rates for the entire network, which are improved even further by energy cooperation.
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U2 - 10.1109/WIOPT.2016.7492899
DO - 10.1109/WIOPT.2016.7492899
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84979659010
T3 - 2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016
BT - 2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016
Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016
ER -