Matching with dynamic ordinal preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents with dynamic ordinal preferences. Despite a recent focus on designing one-shot matching mechanisms in the absence of monetary transfers, little study has been done on strategic behavior of agents in sequential assignment problems. We formulate a generic dynamic matching problem via a sequential stochastic matching process. We design a mechanism based on random serial dictatorship (RSD) that, given any history of preferences and matching decisions, guarantees global stochastic strategyproofness while satisfying desirable local properties. We further investigate the notion of envyfreeness in such sequential settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages936-943
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357001
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015
Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
Duration: Jan 25 2015Jan 30 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2

Other

Other29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAustin
Period1/25/151/30/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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