In a symmetric-key cryptography system, it is often required to transmit a nonuniform message from a very large set. In this case, a computationally unbounded adversary can take advantage of the non-uniformity of the posterior to recover the message. Recently an encryption scheme called Honey Encryption has been proposed to increase the information-theoretic security of the system, i.e., guaranteed level of security regardless of the computational power of the adversary. In this paper, we present a technique called message partitioning which can be used to accomplish the same goal. We analyze the overall security of the combination of this technique with Honey Encryption, which uses a Distribution Transforming Encoder (DTE) block. We propose a new DTE which has an acceptable performance under limited amount of available auxiliary randomness. Achievable bounds are presented for both cases, which under certain conditions, are close to the lower bounds on the level of the success of the adversary.