Abstract
A security policy is a means by which participant session requirements are specified. However, existing frameworks provide limited facilities for the automated reconciliation of participant policies. This paper considers the limits and methods of reconciliation in a general-purpose policy model. We identify an algorithm for efficient two-policy reconciliation, and show that, in the worst-case, reconciliation of three or more policies is intractable. Further, we suggest efficient heuristics for the detection and resolution of intractable reconciliation. Based upon the policy model, we describe the design and implementation of the Ismene policy language. The expressiveness of Ismene, and indirectly of our model, is demonstrated through the representation and exposition of policies supported by existing policy languages. We conclude with brief notes on the integration and enforcement of Ismene policy within the Antigone communication system.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 73-87 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2002 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Software
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