Abstract
A minimum wage raises average wages along with modest increases in employees' average effort levels, generating a Pareto improvement in social welfare. The minimum wage reduces effort in the neighborhood of the minimum, but has no systematic effect on effort levels at higher wages. As a consequence average effort increases modestly with a minimum wage as it raises average wages. Similar results are reported within groups, both when introducing and eliminating a minimum wage, although the within group effects of introducing a minimum wage are stronger than dropping it.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 317-326 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2010 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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