TY - JOUR
T1 - MLSNet
T2 - A Policy Complying Multilevel Security Framework for Software Defined Networking
AU - Achleitner, Stefan
AU - Burke, Quinn
AU - Mcdaniel, Patrick
AU - Jaeger, Trent
AU - Porta, Thomas La
AU - Krishnamurthy, Srikanth
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - Ensuring that information flowing through a network is secure from manipulation and eavesdropping by unauthorized parties is an important task for network administrators. Many cyber attacks rely on a lack of network-level information flow controls to successfully compromise a victim network. Once an adversary exploits an initial entry point, they can eavesdrop and move laterally within the network (e.g., scan and penetrate internal nodes) to further their malicious goals. In this article, we propose a novel multilevel security (MLS) framework to enforce a secure inter-node information flow policy within the network and therein vastly reduce the attack surface available to an adversary who has penetrated it. In contrast to prior work on multilevel security in computer networks which relied on enforcing the policy at network endpoints, we leverage the centralization of software-defined networks (SDNs) by moving the task to the controller and providing this service transparently to all network nodes. Our framework, MLSNet, formalizes the generation of a policy compliant network configuration (i.e., set of flow rules on the SDN switches) as network optimization problems, with the objectives of (1) maximizing the number of flows satisfying all security constraints and (2) minimizing the security cost of routing any remaining flows to guarantee availability. We demonstrate that MLSNet can securely and efficiently route flows that satisfy the security constraints and route the remaining flows with a minimal security cost (e.g., route >85% of flows, where the heuristic achieves 89% and 87% of the optimal solutions for the optimization problems).
AB - Ensuring that information flowing through a network is secure from manipulation and eavesdropping by unauthorized parties is an important task for network administrators. Many cyber attacks rely on a lack of network-level information flow controls to successfully compromise a victim network. Once an adversary exploits an initial entry point, they can eavesdrop and move laterally within the network (e.g., scan and penetrate internal nodes) to further their malicious goals. In this article, we propose a novel multilevel security (MLS) framework to enforce a secure inter-node information flow policy within the network and therein vastly reduce the attack surface available to an adversary who has penetrated it. In contrast to prior work on multilevel security in computer networks which relied on enforcing the policy at network endpoints, we leverage the centralization of software-defined networks (SDNs) by moving the task to the controller and providing this service transparently to all network nodes. Our framework, MLSNet, formalizes the generation of a policy compliant network configuration (i.e., set of flow rules on the SDN switches) as network optimization problems, with the objectives of (1) maximizing the number of flows satisfying all security constraints and (2) minimizing the security cost of routing any remaining flows to guarantee availability. We demonstrate that MLSNet can securely and efficiently route flows that satisfy the security constraints and route the remaining flows with a minimal security cost (e.g., route >85% of flows, where the heuristic achieves 89% and 87% of the optimal solutions for the optimization problems).
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U2 - 10.1109/TNSM.2020.3045998
DO - 10.1109/TNSM.2020.3045998
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85098748963
SN - 1932-4537
VL - 18
SP - 729
EP - 744
JO - IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
JF - IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
IS - 1
M1 - 9300252
ER -