Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Assessing False-Data Injection Attacks on Transportation Networks

Taha Eghtesad, Sirui Li, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Aron Laszka

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

The increasing reliance of drivers on navigation applications has made transportation networks more susceptible to data-manipulation attacks by malicious actors. Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities in the data collection or processing of navigation services to inject false information, and to thus interfere with the drivers' route selection. Such attacks can significantly increase traffic congestions, resulting in substantial waste of time and resources, and may even disrupt essential services that rely on road networks. To assess the threat posed by such attacks, we introduce a computational framework to find worst-case data-injection attacks against transportation networks. First, we devise an adversarial model with a threat actor who can manipulate drivers by increasing the travel times that they perceive on certain roads. Then, we employ hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning to find an approximate optimal adversarial strategy for data manipulation. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through simulating attacks on the Sioux Falls, ND network topology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)508-515
Number of pages8
JournalProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2024-May
StatePublished - 2024
Event23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2024 - Auckland, New Zealand
Duration: May 6 2024May 10 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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