Multiple assignment problems under lexicographic preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota Under lexicographic preferences, wc characterize the set of strategy-proof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying these properties We then extend quota mechanisms to randomized settings, and show that the random serial dictatorship quota mechanisms (RSDQ) are envyfree, strategy-proof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies envyfreeness when preferences are lexicographic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages837-845
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781510892002
StatePublished - 2019
Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: May 13 2019May 17 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period5/13/195/17/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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