Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks

Youngmi Jin; George Kesidis

doi:10.1109/infcom.2003.1208960

Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks

Youngmi Jin, George Kesidis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

A generic mechanism for end-user transmission rate control into a differentiated services Internet is formulated and basic results of corresponding Nash equilibria are proved. We consider specific examples of the mechanism including additive increase and multiplicative decrease inspired by present day TCP congestion control. For the example of users sharing access to a bandwidth resource via resizable provisioned label-switched paths (MPLS), we study the equilibria and the performance of the generic mechanism and give analytical results on convergence to equilibria. The fairness of the resulting equilibria when user demands exceed available network resources is also studied.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1242-1249
Number of pages	8
Journal	Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/infcom.2003.1208960
State	Published - 2003
Event	22nd Annual Joint Conference on the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies - San Francisco, CA, United States Duration: Mar 30 2003 → Apr 3 2003

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Computer Science
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/infcom.2003.1208960

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abstract = "A generic mechanism for end-user transmission rate control into a differentiated services Internet is formulated and basic results of corresponding Nash equilibria are proved. We consider specific examples of the mechanism including additive increase and multiplicative decrease inspired by present day TCP congestion control. For the example of users sharing access to a bandwidth resource via resizable provisioned label-switched paths (MPLS), we study the equilibria and the performance of the generic mechanism and give analytical results on convergence to equilibria. The fairness of the resulting equilibria when user demands exceed available network resources is also studied.",

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AU - Kesidis, George

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AB - A generic mechanism for end-user transmission rate control into a differentiated services Internet is formulated and basic results of corresponding Nash equilibria are proved. We consider specific examples of the mechanism including additive increase and multiplicative decrease inspired by present day TCP congestion control. For the example of users sharing access to a bandwidth resource via resizable provisioned label-switched paths (MPLS), we study the equilibria and the performance of the generic mechanism and give analytical results on convergence to equilibria. The fairness of the resulting equilibria when user demands exceed available network resources is also studied.

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T2 - 22nd Annual Joint Conference on the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies

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ER -

Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks

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