New side channels targeted at passwords

Albert Tannous, Jonathan Trostle, Mohamed Hassan, Stephen E. McLaughlin, Trent Jaeger

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


Side channels are typically viewed as attacks that leak cryptographic keys during cryptographic algorithm processing, by observation of system side effects. In this paper, we present new side channels that leak password information during X Windows keyboard processing of password input. Keylogging is one approach for stealing passwords, but current keylogging techniques require special hardware or privileged processes. However, we have found that the unprivileged operation of modifying the user key mappings for X Windows clients enables a side channel sufficient for unprivileged processes to steal that user's passwords, even enabling the attacker to gain root access via sudo. We successfully tested one version on Linux 2.6; we were able to obtain a high degree of control over the scheduler, and thus we can obtain accurate timing information. A second version (logon detection) works without depending on accurate clocks or cache effects. Thus, in addition to demonstrating new side channels, we show that (a) side channels cannot be eliminated by removing accurate clocks or hardware cache mechanisms (b) side channels are of continued concern for computer security as well as cryptographic processing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4721543
Pages (from-to)45-54
Number of pages10
JournalProceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
StatePublished - 2008
Event24th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2008 - Anaheim, CA, United States
Duration: Dec 8 2008Dec 12 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality


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