TY - JOUR
T1 - Nuclear arms race in Asia
T2 - Players, stakes and predicates for stability
AU - Cimbala, Stephen J.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2018/10/20
Y1 - 2018/10/20
N2 - North Korea’s unpredictable behavior with respect to its nuclear arsenal is only one element of a nuclear arms competition among powers in Asia. Nuclear Asia is a potential cockpit for an outbreak of accidental nuclear war or deliberate nuclear first use, as among regional rivals and adversaries. In addition, a limited nuclear war between regional enemies could ignite intervention by outside powers and intensify, in terms of its potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. Research does not support a definitive relationship between the numbers of nuclear weapons states acting in Asia or in the Pacific and the probability of war, including nuclear war. On the other hand, the availability of nuclear weapons may make more states risk acceptant instead of risk averse in regional conflicts, and overconfident with respect to their skills in managing escalation. That finding is important because states’ abilities to manage escalation may be more important than the sizes of their arsenals.
AB - North Korea’s unpredictable behavior with respect to its nuclear arsenal is only one element of a nuclear arms competition among powers in Asia. Nuclear Asia is a potential cockpit for an outbreak of accidental nuclear war or deliberate nuclear first use, as among regional rivals and adversaries. In addition, a limited nuclear war between regional enemies could ignite intervention by outside powers and intensify, in terms of its potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. Research does not support a definitive relationship between the numbers of nuclear weapons states acting in Asia or in the Pacific and the probability of war, including nuclear war. On the other hand, the availability of nuclear weapons may make more states risk acceptant instead of risk averse in regional conflicts, and overconfident with respect to their skills in managing escalation. That finding is important because states’ abilities to manage escalation may be more important than the sizes of their arsenals.
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U2 - 10.1080/01495933.2018.1526579
DO - 10.1080/01495933.2018.1526579
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85063569195
SN - 0149-5933
VL - 37
SP - 460
EP - 471
JO - Comparative Strategy
JF - Comparative Strategy
IS - 5
ER -