Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Robert C. Marshall; Michael J. Meurer; Jean Francois Richard; Walter Stromquist

doi:10.1006/game.1994.1045

Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean Francois Richard, Walter Stromquist

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

129 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	193-220
Number of pages	28
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	7
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1045
State	Published - Sep 1994

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.1994.1045

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abstract = "We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.",

author = "Marshall, {Robert C.} and Meurer, {Michael J.} and Richard, {Jean Francois} and Walter Stromquist",

note = "Funding Information: Financial support for this work has been provided by the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation (SES-9012202), and the Pew Charitable Trust. We are indebted to John Geweke, Dan Graham, Dan Levin, John Riley, and especially Bob Weber for numerous helpful discussions. Susan Athey and Laura Baldwin provided skillful research assistance.",

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AU - Meurer, Michael J.

AU - Richard, Jean Francois

AU - Stromquist, Walter

N1 - Funding Information: Financial support for this work has been provided by the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation (SES-9012202), and the Pew Charitable Trust. We are indebted to John Geweke, Dan Graham, Dan Levin, John Riley, and especially Bob Weber for numerous helpful discussions. Susan Athey and Laura Baldwin provided skillful research assistance.

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N2 - We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.

AB - We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.

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Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Abstract

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