On a truthful mechanism for expiring spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

Shabnam Sodagari; Alireza Attar; Sven G. Bilén

doi:10.1109/JSAC.2011.110416

On a truthful mechanism for expiring spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, Sven G. Bilén

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study how truthfulness can be enforced as a dominant strategy when a number of secondary cognitive radios participate in an online expiring spectrum sharing auction, held by the primary to lease its spectrum holes. The types of secondary cognitive radios, announced to the primary, are composed of valuation and arrivaldeparture periods. We show how, by the suitable choice of channel allocation and pricing schemes, the collusion incentive among secondary cognitive radios can be reduced. The performance of the deployed dynamic auction is compared with that of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) offline auction as a benchmark.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	5738227
Pages (from-to)	856-865
Number of pages	10
Journal	IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume	29
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2011.110416
State	Published - Apr 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/JSAC.2011.110416

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On a truthful mechanism for expiring spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

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