TY - GEN
T1 - On cellular botnets
T2 - 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'09
AU - Traynor, Patrick
AU - Lin, Michael
AU - Ongtang, MacHigar
AU - Rao, Vikhyath
AU - Jaeger, Trent
AU - McDaniel, Patrick
AU - La Porta, Thomas
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - The vast expansion of interconnectivity with the Internet and the rapid evolution of highly-capable but largely insecure mobile devices threatens cellular networks. In this paper, we characterize the impact of the large scale compromise and coordination of mobile phones in attacks against the core of these networks. Through a combination of measurement, simulation and analysis, we demonstrate the ability of a botnet composed of as few as 11,750 compromised mobile phones to degrade service to area-code sized regions by 93%. As such attacks are accomplished through the execution of network service requests and not a constant stream of phone calls, users are unlikely to be aware of their occurrence. We then investigate a number of significant network bottlenecks, their impact on the density of compromised nodes per base station and how they can be avoided. We conclude by discussing a number of countermeasures that may help to partially mitigate the threats posed by such attacks.
AB - The vast expansion of interconnectivity with the Internet and the rapid evolution of highly-capable but largely insecure mobile devices threatens cellular networks. In this paper, we characterize the impact of the large scale compromise and coordination of mobile phones in attacks against the core of these networks. Through a combination of measurement, simulation and analysis, we demonstrate the ability of a botnet composed of as few as 11,750 compromised mobile phones to degrade service to area-code sized regions by 93%. As such attacks are accomplished through the execution of network service requests and not a constant stream of phone calls, users are unlikely to be aware of their occurrence. We then investigate a number of significant network bottlenecks, their impact on the density of compromised nodes per base station and how they can be avoided. We conclude by discussing a number of countermeasures that may help to partially mitigate the threats posed by such attacks.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=74049108559&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=74049108559&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1653662.1653690
DO - 10.1145/1653662.1653690
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:74049108559
SN - 9781605583525
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 223
EP - 234
BT - CCS'09 - Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Y2 - 9 November 2009 through 13 November 2009
ER -