TY - JOUR
T1 - On delays in project completion with cost reduction
T2 - An experiment
AU - Sarkar, Shubhro
AU - Kwasnica, Anthony M.
PY - 2011/1
Y1 - 2011/1
N2 - We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such circumstances the provision of the project always involves delay. Because this game involves coordination on complex, dynamic strategies in the face of asymmetries in payoffs, we examine behavior in the laboratory.
AB - We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such circumstances the provision of the project always involves delay. Because this game involves coordination on complex, dynamic strategies in the face of asymmetries in payoffs, we examine behavior in the laboratory.
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U2 - 10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.557
DO - 10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.557
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79952176856
SN - 0038-4038
VL - 77
SP - 557
EP - 584
JO - Southern Economic Journal
JF - Southern Economic Journal
IS - 3
ER -