TY - GEN
T1 - On demystifying the android application framework
T2 - 25th USENIX Security Symposium
AU - Backes, Michael
AU - Bugiel, Sven
AU - Derr, Erik
AU - McDaniel, Patrick
AU - Octeau, Damien
AU - Weisgerber, Sebastian
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - In contrast to the Android application layer, Android’s application framework’s internals and their influence on the platform security and user privacy are still largely a black box for us. In this paper, we establish a static runtime model of the application framework in order to study its internals and provide the first high-level classification of the framework’s protected resources. We thereby uncover design patterns that differ highly from the runtime model at the application layer. We demonstrate the benefits of our insights for security-focused analysis of the framework by re-visiting the important use-case of mapping Android permissions to framework/SDK API methods. We, in particular, present a novel mapping based on our findings that significantly improves on prior results in this area that were established based on insufficient knowledge about the framework’s internals. Moreover, we introduce the concept of permission locality to show that although framework services follow the principle of separation of duty, the accompanying permission checks to guard sensitive operations violate it.
AB - In contrast to the Android application layer, Android’s application framework’s internals and their influence on the platform security and user privacy are still largely a black box for us. In this paper, we establish a static runtime model of the application framework in order to study its internals and provide the first high-level classification of the framework’s protected resources. We thereby uncover design patterns that differ highly from the runtime model at the application layer. We demonstrate the benefits of our insights for security-focused analysis of the framework by re-visiting the important use-case of mapping Android permissions to framework/SDK API methods. We, in particular, present a novel mapping based on our findings that significantly improves on prior results in this area that were established based on insufficient knowledge about the framework’s internals. Moreover, we introduce the concept of permission locality to show that although framework services follow the principle of separation of duty, the accompanying permission checks to guard sensitive operations violate it.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076463747&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85076463747&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 1101
EP - 1116
BT - Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 10 August 2016 through 12 August 2016
ER -