On manipulablity of random serial dictatorship in sequential matching with dynamic preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages4168-4169
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357049
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015
Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
Duration: Jan 25 2015Jan 30 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume6

Other

Other29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAustin
Period1/25/151/30/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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