TY - GEN
T1 - One-sided matching with dynamic preferences (doctoral consortium)
AU - Hosseini, Hadi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - One-sided matching is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to a set of agents, in the absence of monetary transfers. In contrast to many real-life scenarios such as shift scheduling or course assignment, traditional matching mechanisms assume that agents precisely know their preferences. However, preferences over alternatives may change over time due to idiosyncratic reasons or as a function of earlier outcomes. My research focuses on the theoretical investigation of dynamic matching markets, along with the experimental study of various matching mechanisms in such dynamic environments. In particular, I design and analyze truthful sequential mechanisms in settings with dynamic ordinal preferences to further elucidate a principled approach to decision making in dynamic models of resource allocation and fill the current gap between stochastic reasoning models and the game-theoretical elements of the matching theory.
AB - One-sided matching is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to a set of agents, in the absence of monetary transfers. In contrast to many real-life scenarios such as shift scheduling or course assignment, traditional matching mechanisms assume that agents precisely know their preferences. However, preferences over alternatives may change over time due to idiosyncratic reasons or as a function of earlier outcomes. My research focuses on the theoretical investigation of dynamic matching markets, along with the experimental study of various matching mechanisms in such dynamic environments. In particular, I design and analyze truthful sequential mechanisms in settings with dynamic ordinal preferences to further elucidate a principled approach to decision making in dynamic models of resource allocation and fill the current gap between stochastic reasoning models and the game-theoretical elements of the matching theory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84944707506&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84944707506&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84944707506
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 2005
EP - 2006
BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
A2 - Bordini, Rafael H.
A2 - Yolum, Pinar
A2 - Elkind, Edith
A2 - Weiss, Gerhard
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
Y2 - 4 May 2015 through 8 May 2015
ER -