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Optimal managerial incentive contracts and the value of corporate insurance
Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw
Finance
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
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peer-review
37
Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
Hedging
100%
Corporate Insurance
100%
Managerial Incentive Contracts
100%
Shareholders
75%
Managerial Effort
50%
Shareholder Wealth
25%
Effort Level
25%
Insurance
25%
Optimal Contract
25%
Managerial Hedging
25%
Moral Hazard Problem
25%
Incentive Contract
25%
Unsystematic Risk
25%
Firm Investment
25%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Corporate Insurance
100%
Managerial Incentives
100%