TY - JOUR
T1 - Ostracism and forgiveness
AU - Ali, S. Nageeb
AU - Miller, David A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2016/8
Y1 - 2016/8
N2 - Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement. Ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness, through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society.
AB - Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement. Ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness, through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.20130768
DO - 10.1257/aer.20130768
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84982973629
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 106
SP - 2329
EP - 2348
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 8
ER -