Packet scheduling against stepping-stone attacks with chaff

Ting He, Parvathinathan Venkitasubramaniam, Lang Tong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Scopus citations


We consider scheduling packet transmissions in a network so that the efficiency of stepping-stone attacks can be severely restrained with the help of stepping-stone monitors. We allow the attacker to encrypt and pad the packets, perturb the timing of packets, and insert chaff packets, but the timing perturbation is subject to a maximum delay constraint. We show that if we randomize packet transmissions, then the attacker has to insert a large amount of chaff to evade detection completely. In particular, if all transmissions are scheduled as Poisson processes, then the fraction of attacking packets in the attacker's traffic decreases exponentially with the length of the intrusion path.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationMilitary Communications Conference 2006, MILCOM 2006
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Print)1424406188, 9781424406180
StatePublished - Jan 1 2006
EventMilitary Communications Conference 2006, MILCOM 2006 - Washington, D.C., United States
Duration: Oct 23 2006Oct 25 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM


OtherMilitary Communications Conference 2006, MILCOM 2006
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWashington, D.C.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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