Abstract
Although discharge petitions lie at the confluence of personal preferences, committee prerogatives, and party leadership in Congress, these procedures have received little scholarly scrutiny. We capitalize on the public nature of petition signatures since 1993 to examine the behavior of the most cross-pressured members in discharge battles: bill sponsors and cosponsors belonging to the majority party who personally prefer the bills they have sponsored but who face party pressure not to sign the petitions that threaten the leadership's control of the legislative agenda. After controlling for personal preferences, we find a statistically significant partisan effect in the U.S. House, which further illuminates the "Where's the party?" debate.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 187-209 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Legislative Studies Quarterly |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2010 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science