Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice

Theodora Bendlin; Hadi Hosseini

doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice

Theodora Bendlin
, Hadi Hosseini

College of Information Sciences and Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
Publisher	AAAI press
Pages	9917-9918
Number of pages	2
ISBN (Electronic)	9781577358091
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917
State	Published - 2019
Event	33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 - Honolulu, United States Duration: Jan 27 2019 → Feb 1 2019

Publication series

Name	33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019

Conference

Conference	33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
Country/Territory	United States
City	Honolulu
Period	1/27/19 → 2/1/19

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Artificial Intelligence

Access to Document

10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Cite this

Bendlin, T., & Hosseini, H. (2019). Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. In 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (pp. 9917-9918). (33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019). AAAI press. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Bendlin, Theodora ; Hosseini, Hadi. / Partners in crime : Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019. AAAI press, 2019. pp. 9917-9918 (33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019).

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title = "Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice",

abstract = "We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.",

author = "Theodora Bendlin and Hadi Hosseini",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.; 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 ; Conference date: 27-01-2019 Through 01-02-2019",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917",

language = "English (US)",

series = "33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019",

publisher = "AAAI press",

pages = "9917--9918",

booktitle = "33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019",

}

Bendlin, T & Hosseini, H 2019, Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. in 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019. 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019, AAAI press, pp. 9917-9918, 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019, Honolulu, United States, 1/27/19. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. / Bendlin, Theodora; Hosseini, Hadi.
33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019. AAAI press, 2019. p. 9917-9918 (33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Partners in crime

T2 - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019

AU - Bendlin, Theodora

AU - Hosseini, Hadi

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.

AB - We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85090802909

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U2 - 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

DO - 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85090802909

T3 - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019

SP - 9917

EP - 9918

BT - 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019

PB - AAAI press

Y2 - 27 January 2019 through 1 February 2019

ER -

Bendlin T, Hosseini H. Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice. In 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019. AAAI press. 2019. p. 9917-9918. (33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019). doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Partners in crime: Manipulating the deferred acceptance algorithm through an accomplice

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

UN SDGs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

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