Abstract
This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 127-138 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 59 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2022 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy