Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders

Daniel A. Graham; Robert C. Marshall; Jean Francois Richard

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z

Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders

Daniel A. Graham, Robert C. Marshall, Jean Francois Richard

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

If IPV bidders are distributionally heterogeneous then a revenue maximizing English auctioneer will, in general, find it optimal to use a non-constant reserve price that is a function of the observed bid sequence. An example is provided.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	13-17
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	32
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z
State	Published - Jan 1990

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z

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title = "Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders",

abstract = "If IPV bidders are distributionally heterogeneous then a revenue maximizing English auctioneer will, in general, find it optimal to use a non-constant reserve price that is a function of the observed bid sequence. An example is provided.",

author = "Graham, {Daniel A.} and Marshall, {Robert C.} and Richard, {Jean Francois}",

note = "Funding Information: * Financial support for this research was provided comments have been provided by Paul Milgrom research assistance.",

year = "1990",

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AU - Graham, Daniel A.

AU - Marshall, Robert C.

AU - Richard, Jean Francois

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PY - 1990/1

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N2 - If IPV bidders are distributionally heterogeneous then a revenue maximizing English auctioneer will, in general, find it optimal to use a non-constant reserve price that is a function of the observed bid sequence. An example is provided.

AB - If IPV bidders are distributionally heterogeneous then a revenue maximizing English auctioneer will, in general, find it optimal to use a non-constant reserve price that is a function of the observed bid sequence. An example is provided.

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VL - 32

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JO - Economics Letters

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Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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