Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt: Modeling a dynamic information environment

Scott Sigmund Gartner

doi:10.1080/03050629308434814

Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt: Modeling a dynamic information environment

Scott Sigmund Gartner

School of International Affairs

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	365-386
Number of pages	22
Journal	International Interactions
Volume	18
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629308434814
State	Published - Aug 1993

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.1080/03050629308434814

Cite this

@article{a612323a7e6f41798863f340a14a3132,

title = "Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt: Modeling a dynamic information environment",

author = "Gartner, {Scott Sigmund}",

note = "Funding Information: Within the Carter administration, Steve Smith identifies three groups of advisors to President Carter central to foreign policy questions: hawks, doves and presidential supporters (Steve Smith, 1988). Smith argues that the views of these actors greatly influenced Carter's decisions. The hawks included National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and National Security Council staffers and Defense Department Personnel (including Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones, Chairman of the JCS). They proposed from the onset of the embassy takeover that the President take decisive, military action (Ryan, 1985). These advisors were concerned that lack ofUS action would convey to the world that the US lacked international commitment In many ways, their concerns mirrored Johnson's in the Vietnam War. The hawks believed that the hostage crises was linked to other issues, and that a lack of decisive action would show a lack of US resolve to pursue its foreign policy interests. This belief intensified after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 (Brzezinski, 1985). The doves consisted of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, and Harold Saunders. Their position was strongly supported by the State Department (Saunders, 1985; Gaddis Smith, 1986). These men were primarily concerned with protecting the lives oftheir State Department colleagues held captive. They opposed military action because they believed it unnecessarily endangered the hostages' lives, and was unlikely to be worth the risk (Christopher, 1985; Vance, 1983). From November 4 through April 15, they consistently opposed the use of force. Five days after the embassy takeover Vance argued that, Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

year = "1993",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1080/03050629308434814",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "18",

pages = "365--386",

journal = "International Interactions",

issn = "0305-0629",

publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt

T2 - Modeling a dynamic information environment

AU - Gartner, Scott Sigmund

N1 - Funding Information: Within the Carter administration, Steve Smith identifies three groups of advisors to President Carter central to foreign policy questions: hawks, doves and presidential supporters (Steve Smith, 1988). Smith argues that the views of these actors greatly influenced Carter's decisions. The hawks included National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and National Security Council staffers and Defense Department Personnel (including Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones, Chairman of the JCS). They proposed from the onset of the embassy takeover that the President take decisive, military action (Ryan, 1985). These advisors were concerned that lack ofUS action would convey to the world that the US lacked international commitment In many ways, their concerns mirrored Johnson's in the Vietnam War. The hawks believed that the hostage crises was linked to other issues, and that a lack of decisive action would show a lack of US resolve to pursue its foreign policy interests. This belief intensified after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 (Brzezinski, 1985). The doves consisted of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, and Harold Saunders. Their position was strongly supported by the State Department (Saunders, 1985; Gaddis Smith, 1986). These men were primarily concerned with protecting the lives oftheir State Department colleagues held captive. They opposed military action because they believed it unnecessarily endangered the hostages' lives, and was unlikely to be worth the risk (Christopher, 1985; Vance, 1983). From November 4 through April 15, they consistently opposed the use of force. Five days after the embassy takeover Vance argued that, Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 1993/8

Y1 - 1993/8

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038865621&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038865621&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/03050629308434814

DO - 10.1080/03050629308434814

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0038865621

SN - 0305-0629

VL - 18

SP - 365

EP - 386

JO - International Interactions

JF - International Interactions

IS - 4

ER -

Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt: Modeling a dynamic information environment

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this