Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 365-386 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | International Interactions |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1993 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations
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In: International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 4, 08.1993, p. 365-386.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Predicting the timing of carter's decision to initiate a hostage rescue attempt
T2 - Modeling a dynamic information environment
AU - Gartner, Scott Sigmund
N1 - Funding Information: Within the Carter administration, Steve Smith identifies three groups of advisors to President Carter central to foreign policy questions: hawks, doves and presidential supporters (Steve Smith, 1988). Smith argues that the views of these actors greatly influenced Carter's decisions. The hawks included National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and National Security Council staffers and Defense Department Personnel (including Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones, Chairman of the JCS). They proposed from the onset of the embassy takeover that the President take decisive, military action (Ryan, 1985). These advisors were concerned that lack ofUS action would convey to the world that the US lacked international commitment In many ways, their concerns mirrored Johnson's in the Vietnam War. The hawks believed that the hostage crises was linked to other issues, and that a lack of decisive action would show a lack of US resolve to pursue its foreign policy interests. This belief intensified after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 (Brzezinski, 1985). The doves consisted of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, and Harold Saunders. Their position was strongly supported by the State Department (Saunders, 1985; Gaddis Smith, 1986). These men were primarily concerned with protecting the lives oftheir State Department colleagues held captive. They opposed military action because they believed it unnecessarily endangered the hostages' lives, and was unlikely to be worth the risk (Christopher, 1985; Vance, 1983). From November 4 through April 15, they consistently opposed the use of force. Five days after the embassy takeover Vance argued that, Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 1993/8
Y1 - 1993/8
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038865621&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038865621&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/03050629308434814
DO - 10.1080/03050629308434814
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0038865621
SN - 0305-0629
VL - 18
SP - 365
EP - 386
JO - International Interactions
JF - International Interactions
IS - 4
ER -