Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

Aslan Askarov; Danfeng Zhang; Andrew C. Myers

doi:10.1145/1866307.1866341

Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

Aslan Askarov, Danfeng Zhang, Andrew C. Myers

Computer Science and Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

111 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	CCS'10 - Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages	297-307
Number of pages	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866341
State	Published - 2010
Event	17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10 - Chicago, IL, United States Duration: Oct 4 2010 → Oct 8 2010

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Other

Other	17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10
Country/Territory	United States
City	Chicago, IL
Period	10/4/10 → 10/8/10

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1145/1866307.1866341

Cite this

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title = "Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels",

abstract = "We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks.",

author = "Aslan Askarov and Danfeng Zhang and Myers, {Andrew C.}",

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note = "17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10 ; Conference date: 04-10-2010 Through 08-10-2010",

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Askarov, A, Zhang, D & Myers, AC 2010, Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. in CCS'10 - Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 297-307, 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10, Chicago, IL, United States, 10/4/10. https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866341

Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. / Askarov, Aslan; Zhang, Danfeng; Myers, Andrew C.
CCS'10 - Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2010. p. 297-307 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AU - Zhang, Danfeng

AU - Myers, Andrew C.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

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AB - We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks.

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T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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BT - CCS'10 - Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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ER -

Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

Abstract

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