TY - GEN
T1 - Pursuit-evasion with acoustic sensing using one step Nash equilibria
AU - Goode, Brian
AU - Kurdila, Andrew
AU - Roan, Mike
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - In this paper, we derive a non-zero-sum multi-player game that models pursuit-evasion tactics in an acoustic field. Specifically, the Pursuer uses acoustic sensing to determine the location of the Evader. However, this sensing ability is corrupted by noise generated from the motion of both the Pursuer and Evader. It is argued that the dominant mechanism of sensory degrading noise from the Pursuer is a function of speed, while the noise from the Evader is a function of acceleration and speed. Depending on the set of parameters characterizing the game, the control evolution exhibits various striking and diverse qualitative features. In some cases, the strategy of choosing actions associated with one step Nash equilibria yields a limit cycle response. This confirms observations by other researchers that the temporal evolution of games need not converge to a single Nash equilibrium and opens opportunities for future analysis on making the correct choice of cost functions by determining the effects this has on the agent's ability to obtain a desired goal.
AB - In this paper, we derive a non-zero-sum multi-player game that models pursuit-evasion tactics in an acoustic field. Specifically, the Pursuer uses acoustic sensing to determine the location of the Evader. However, this sensing ability is corrupted by noise generated from the motion of both the Pursuer and Evader. It is argued that the dominant mechanism of sensory degrading noise from the Pursuer is a function of speed, while the noise from the Evader is a function of acceleration and speed. Depending on the set of parameters characterizing the game, the control evolution exhibits various striking and diverse qualitative features. In some cases, the strategy of choosing actions associated with one step Nash equilibria yields a limit cycle response. This confirms observations by other researchers that the temporal evolution of games need not converge to a single Nash equilibrium and opens opportunities for future analysis on making the correct choice of cost functions by determining the effects this has on the agent's ability to obtain a desired goal.
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U2 - 10.1109/acc.2010.5531356
DO - 10.1109/acc.2010.5531356
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:77957782842
SN - 9781424474264
T3 - Proceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference, ACC 2010
SP - 1925
EP - 1930
BT - Proceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference, ACC 2010
PB - IEEE Computer Society
ER -